Here you can see an updated list of local events.

 

IUSS PHILOSOPHY SEMINARS

HUMATH Seminar Series: spring 2026

April 8, 2026 – 14-16 (I.15): Jessica Carter (Aarhus University), “Diagrams in mathematical practice: Lotuses as unifying objects”

April 9, 2026 – 16-18 (I.17): Mikkel Gerken (University of Southern Denmark), “Science Selectivism and Science Skepticism”

April 16, 2026 – 16-18 (I.17): Anne Meylan (University of Zurich), “Inquiry Without Curiosity”

April 23, 2026 – 15-17 (I.17): Brett Topey (IUSS Pavia), “Sensitivity, Lotteries, and Induction”

May 7, 2026 – 16-18 (I.17): Federica Malfatti (University of Innsbruck), “AI Understanding?”

May 14, 2026 – 16-18 (I.17): Sandy Goldberg (Northwestern University), “The Expected Common Ground”

May 20, 2026 – 15-17 (I.17): Marco Panza (Chapman University), “Platonism without Existence (and Truth)”

May 21, 2026 – 16-18 (I.17): Mario Piazza (Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa), “From Proofs to Chessboard: Poincaré on Mathematical Understanding”

 

HUMATH Seminar Series: fall 2025, flyer

November 25, 2025 – 16-18 (I.15):

Lilith Mace (University of Glasgow), “Kinds of Doubt”

Our doubt talk is varied. We talk of having doubts that P, about doubting that P, and being in doubt with respect to P, to give a few examples. Some epistemologists have taken this variety in our ‘doubt’ talk to indicate a variety of doubt states. In this talk, I argue that this is a bad way of accruing ontological commitments in one’s epistemological theorising. I’ll propose a better one, which has to do with normative conflict between doxastic states. In short, we should be committed to as many distinct doxastic states as are required to explain genuine normative conflicts in one’s doxastic profile. Linguistic data suggests that there are, after all, differences in the normative profiles of having doubts, doubting that and being in doubt, suggesting three different doubt states. I’ll consider some ways of accounting for these normative differences using extant theories of doubt, and find them wanting. I’ll then propose my own theory of the nature of doubt, which accounts for this normative difference, but manages to do so without positing multiple kinds of doubt. Rather, the difference in doubt that underpins these normative differences is argued to be a difference in degrees of one doubt-state, rather than a difference in kind between doubt-states.

 

December 4, 2025 – 16-18 (I.17):

Matteo de Ceglie (IUSS Pavia), “What makes a mathematical proof ‘good’?”

Abstract: In this paper, I plan to tackle the question of what makes a mathematical proof “good”. Such a question has been in the centre of the philosophy of mathematics for a very long time. Recently, Granville (2023) investigated the question from the perspective of a working mathematician. In that paper, he distinguishes between “formal” and “culturally appropriate, intuitive” proofs. The first kind of proofs are the gap-less sequences of instances of axioms or application of rules that logicians know and love. According to Granville, these formal proofs are not “good” mathematical proofs, since they are not intuitive, and tend to muddle the reasons behind a mathematical result. On the other hand, we have “good” proofs. These are the intuitive proofs that we can (easily) understand, that convince us of the results they claim to prove, and that can be used as a springboard to prove novel and original theorems. Granville’s claims
are perfectly plausible and appealing, but he doesn’t give any reason (other than some examples) on why formal proofs are not intuitive and culturally appropriate. I argue that adherence to Grice’s Cooperation Principle (Grice (1975)) provides those reasons. In other words: a formal proof is not a “good” mathematical proof because it doesn’t satisfy Grice’s maxims of the Cooperation Principle.

 

December 11, 2025 – 15-17 (I.15):

Pierluigi Graziani (University of Urbino), “Do Not Go Gentle into That Geometric Proof: On Simplicity, Readability, and Interestingness”

Abstract: Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) and Automated Theorem Finding (ATF) are well-established research domains in mathematics, characterized by a wealth of methods and results, as well as numerous open questions that attest to their continuing vitality.
Among these, three stand out as particularly relevant for current investigations. The first concerns the definition of a criterion to measure the simplicity of a proof; the second, a criterion to assess its readability; and the third, a criterion to evaluate the degree of interest of a theorem.
Each of these three problems holds intrinsic value for mathematics as a whole. However, this seminar will focus on their implications within the context of automated theorem proving and theorem finding in geometry.
It will also examine how these three questions are conceptually connected, and how a unified perspective on them may contribute to a clearer understanding of both the process and the product of automated reasoning in geometry.

 

December 17, 2025 – 15-17 (I.15):

Giorgio Volpe (University of Bologna), “Evolutionary debunking and propositional justification”

The genealogical contingency of our ideas has long concerned European thinkers, but until relatively recent times philosophers in the analytic tradition used to dismiss debunking genealogies as instances of a genetic fallacy arising from a confusion between two distinct and fundamentally independent contexts
– the context of discovery and the context of justification. More recently, the appearance of reliabilist accounts of knowledge and epistemic justification and the formulation of evolutionary debunking arguments (henceforth: EDAs) drawing on scientifically respectable evolutionary psychology rather than speculative socio-historical reconstructions has led many analytic philosophers to reevaluate the status of debunking genealogies. In the talk, I focus on two different types of EDAs – blocking and defeating ones – and bring the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification to bear on the different ways such arguments affect (if successful) the epistemic status of their target beliefs.

 

Epistemology and Mathematics Series – 2023-2025

  • September 8, 2025 – 15-17 – Sala del Camino:

James Owen Weatherall (University of California, Irvine), “Multiple Mechanisms for Polarization“

Recent modeling work has uncovered a number of mechanisms that are sufficient to cause belief polarization in societies.  This talk will present several models of polarization and discuss ways they might be useful in thinking about real world phenomena.  It will also reflect on what it means that polarization can arise from so many different mechanics, and how that complicates policy proposals intended to reduce polarization.

 

 

 

WORKSHOPS 2023-2026: 

 

 

CONFERENCES: 

June 18-21, 2024: 7th International Meeting of the Association for the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (APMP)

 

 

VISITORS:

  • Matteo De Ceglie (1 October 2024 – 31 December 2025)
  • Javier Legris, University of Buenos Aires (1-30 June, 2024)
  • Elijah Chudnoff, University of Miami (13-22 May, 2024)